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Me Williams v.
Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors:
TITLE VII HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
CLAIMS CANNOT
BE SUSTAINED
WHERE BOTH
ALLEGED
HARASSER AND
VICTIM ARE
HETEROSEXUALS
OF THE SAME SEX
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In Me Williams v.
Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th
Cir. 1996), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that hostile environment claims of sexual harassment under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ("Title
VII") cannot be sustained where
both the alleged harasser and
victim are heterosexuals of the
same sex. In so holding, the
court left open the possibility
that sexual orientation could be
both an element of and a defense to sexual harassment
claims.
Plaintiff
Mark
McWilliams was employed by
the Newington Facility of the
Fairfax County Management
Transportation
Agency
("EMTA") as an automotive
mechanic. Beginning in 1989,
Mc Williams was besieged by a
variety of offensive conduct
carried out by a group of his
coworkers known as the "lube
boys." The activities of the
lube boys included teasing and
physical assaults such as blindfolding McWilliams, simulating oral sex, and fondling him.
In addition, sex permeated the
atmosphere at EMTA: copies
of Playboy were displayed in
the bathrooms; and centerfold
pictures and off-color cartoons
were circulated around the
workplace. McWilliams complained to his supervisors about
some of these activities. In
October 1992, McWilliams informed EMT A management
that he had been sexual Iy abused

and filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC").
In July of 1993, the
EEOC issued aright-to-sue letter. McWilliams then filed suit
against the County and several
supervisors in the United States
District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia alleging
workplace discrimination under Title VII and violation of
equal protection rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Before trial, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment concl uding that
neither the County nor the supervisors had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct
of the "lube boys." McWilliams
appealed and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reviewed the dismissal
de novo.
The court began its analysis by rejecting Mc Williams's
Title VII claim of sexual harassment. Me Williams v.
Fairfax County Bd. ofSupervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1194-95
(4th Cir. 1996) (citing Title VII).
Title VII condemns employer
discrimination against an individual "because of' the individual's sex. Id. (citing Title
VII). There are two types of
sexual harassment claims under Title VII: (1) quid pro quo
harassment -- requiring sexual
favors in exchange for benefits
of employment, and (2) "sexually-oriented harassment by
one's fellow employees sufficiently egregious to create a
'hostile workplace environment' that is knowingly tolerat-
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ed by the employer." Id. at
1195 (quoting Title VII) (emphasis added). Significantly,
the
court
noted
that
McWilliams's claim involved
only hostile environment harassment. McWilliams, 72F.3d
at 1195. The elements of hostile environment sexual harassment are: (1) the conduct was
unwelcome, (2) the harassment
was based on the "sex" of the
alleged victim, (3) the harassment was "sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive working environment," and
(4) there is some basis for "imputing liability to the employer." Id. (citing Swentek v.
USAIR, Inc., 830 F .2d 552, 557
(4th Cir. 1987».
Defendants claimed
Mc Williams failed to prove that
the defendants knew or should
have known of the lube boys'
conduct and, thus, there was no
basis for imputing liability.
McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195.
The court, however, declined to
address that issue and instead
held that Mc Williams's hostile
environment claim failed for
"the more fundamental reason"
that such claims cannot prevail
where both the alleged harassers and the alleged victim are
the same sex and heterosexual.
Id. In reaching this conclusion,
the court analyzed the language
of the statute. Id. at 1195-96.
Specifically, the court examined the phrase "because of the
[target's] 'sex'" and determined
that same sex heterosexual conduct is beyond the scope of the
statute. Id. 1195-96. The court
also noted that to extend the

phrase to include such behavior
would
be
to
create
"unmanageably broad protection ofthe sensibilities of workers simply 'in matters of sex.'"
Id. at 1196. The court acknowledged that a law covering such
conduct might be needed, but
emphasized that Title VII was
not the appropriate law. Id.
The court similarly rej ected Mc Williams's equal protectionclaim under 42 U.S.c. §
1983 for gender discrimination.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The court concluded that such a
claim under 42 U.S.c. § 1983
was identical to a hostile workplace claim under Title VII and
therefore failed for the same
reasons. Id.
The court next rejected
McWilliams's substantive due
process claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id. at 1196-97 (citing
42U.S.C. § 1983). McWilliams
claimed that as a result of actual
physical assaults he was deprived of his substantive due
process rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id. at 1197 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1983). The court first
noted that, in determining liability under § 1983, principles
of respondeat superior do not
apply. Id. Since the defendants
did not participate in the abuse,
the only remaining potential for
liability would be if culpability
by tacit condonation could be
shown. I d. at 1197. The court,
however, rejected this possibility, finding that McWilliams
failed to establish that either the
county or any ofMc Williams's
supervisors knew or should have
known of the physical abuse.

Id. at 1197-98. Finally, the
court rejected McWilliams's
claim that deficiencies in the
county's training program
amounted to "policy-as-effective-cause" because he failed to
show that there was a direct
causal link between the deficiencies and the injuries he sustained. Id. at 1198.
In sum, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's
dismissal
of
McWilliams's claims. Id. The
court held that hostile environment sexual harassment claims
under Title VII and equal protection claims of gender discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 cannot be sustained where
the alleged harasser and victim
are heterosexuals of the same
sex. Id.
In his dissent, Circuit
Judge Michael criticized the
majority for characterizing the
defendants' actions as mere
"meanness and horseplay." Id.
Title VII is violated, the dissent
asserted, whenever a person
abuses a co-worker out of sexual interest or desire. Id. This,
the dissent maintained, could
be established by the acts of the
defendants. Id. While concedingthat sexual orientation could
be relevant to a charge of sexual
harassment, the dissent argued
that evidence of sexual orientation should not be required as
an element of a Title VII claim.
ld. The dissent expressed concern that the majority holding
will shift the focus in such cases
to a pursuit of the '''true' sexual
orientation" of the harasser,
rather than an inquiry into what
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occurred. Id
In McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, the United States
Court of Appeals for theF ourth
Circuit held that hostile environment claims of sexual harassment under Title VII cannot be sustained where both the
alleged harasser and victim are
heterosexuals of the same sex.
The court's holding effectively
makes sexual orientation an element ofa hostile-environment
sexual harassment claim under
Title VII. Although the court
merely contemplated requiring
a plaintiff to prove homosexuality in same sex cases, the court
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left the door open for inquiry
into sexual orientation in any
sexual harassment case. This is
troublesome be9ause, as the dissent warns, the decision may
shift the focus in sexual harassment cases to pursuits of the
defendants' true sexual orientation. Also left open is the
possibility that sexual orientation could become a defense to
claims of sexual harassment.
For example, a man charged
with sexually harassing a female co-worker may be able to
raise homosexuality as a defense. Moreover, while declaring that harassing conduct of a
sexual nature directed at same

sex co-workers is insufficient
to show actual sexual orientation, the court failed to provide
the lower courts with a workable standard by which the lower court might determine whether a person is a homosexual.
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